This post was written by David Wagner.
Recently, Reed Smith represented Dravo Corporation in a case captioned Morrison Enterprises, LLC v. Dravo Corporation, before the District Court for the District of Nebraska and the Eighth Circuit. Given that several significant issues were addressed in the Eighth Circuit’s decision, we address the key holdings in two different posts. This post addresses the issue of cost recovery versus contribution. A separate post discusses two issues relating to application of the statute of limitations.
The Decision: CERCLA’s Contribution Section Provides the Exclusive Remedy for a Liable Party Compelled to Incur Response Costs Pursuant to an Administrative Settlement
For four years, courts have been addressing an issue under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) left open by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007): whether a liable party sustaining expenses pursuant to a settlement following a suit under CERCLA Sections 106 or 107(a) could recover such compelled costs under Section 107(a), Section 113(f), or both. In ruling on this issue, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that CERCLA Section 113(f) – CERCLA’s contribution section – provides the exclusive remedy for a liable party compelled to incur response costs pursuant to an administrative or judicially approved settlement under Sections 106 or 107. Morrison Enterprises, LLC v. Dravo Corporation, 2011 WL 1237526 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 2011).
In the case, Appellants Morrison Enterprises, LLC (Morrison) and the city of Hastings, Nebraska – both of which were liable under CERCLA for hazardous substances released into the groundwater – sued Dravo Corporation, a manufacturing site owner also liable under CERCLA. The Appellants filed suit under CERCLA Section 107 and sought to recover groundwater contamination costs related to the operation of Well D, a groundwater extraction and treatment system located downgradient of each party’s relevant source of contamination. The District Court granted Dravo Corporation’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Section 113(f) was the Appellants’ exclusive remedy. The Circuit Court affirmed.
At the outset, the Circuit Court explained that “liable parties which have been subject to Section 106 or 107 enforcement actions are still required to use Section 113.” In ruling for Dravo Corporation, the court held that, because Morrison and the city of Hastings were liable parties compelled to incur response costs pursuant to an administrative or judicially approved settlement under Sections 106 or 107, they could only bring a Section 113(f) claim for contribution.
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